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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the impact of performance
management and the application of targets on
public services, particularly the police service. It
identifies the unintended consequences of targets
on the delivery of service and notes that in 1999
HMIC were to raise serious doubts as to the
value of this management approach for public
policing in England and Wales. It considers the
impact of ‘micro-management’ on services that
performance management ultimately represents. It
goes on to reassess the purported attractions of
performance management and presents an altern-
ative in terms of a more holistic and local
management approach based on a ‘systems’
application which highlights the value of local
feedback as a driver for service delivery. It chal-
lenges the highly centralised and mechanistic
orientation which performance management, as
pursued by New Labour, now represents. It
concludes by arguing that a ‘systems approach’
would fit well within the planned roll-out of the
new Neighbourhood Policing strategy while also
providing a sound platform for the Basic Com-
mand Unit reform proposals recently identified by
an influential police association.
INTRODUCTION
A recent HMIC report dealing with the
performance of Nottinghamshire Police has
once again highlighted a continuing com-
mitment by Government to use its powers
of intervention to improve performance
both in the police and other public services.
Underperformance identified within this
police force has now created a potential
threat to all of its chief officers. As the
HMIC’s report makes clear, in the absence
of evidence of clear improvement of police
service over the next six months, the jobs of
both the chief constable and that of his
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most senior colleagues would be at risk
(Foggo, 2005).
Nottinghamshire’s experience has to date
proved to be the most serious challenge
thrown down by the Home Office in rela-
tion to underperformance identified by the
Home Secretary. It follows on from the
Police Reform Act 2002 which gave the
Home Secretary significantly greater
powers in relation to individual forces and
their chief officers.
The continued commitment on the part
of New Labour to performance measures
for public services remains central to its
policy programme. In recent months Gov-
ernment Ministers have highlighted the
centrality of this management approach to
public services. The Secretary for Health,
Patricia Hewitt was to state at the 2005
summer BMA conference that, despite
deep concern about the impact of perform-
ance targets on hospital care, she would not
‘resile’ from the use of targets, stating that
they were ‘helping to achieve much needed
improvements in services’ (Hoggart, 2005).
Elsewhere, in her capacity as Minister for
Police, Hazel Blears at the Home Office
was to applaud the success of police and
local authorities on the number of Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) initiated
by them. With 3,600 ASBOs initiated over
an 18-month period to June 2005 they
were, she stated, coming close to reaching
the national target of 5,000 set by her
department (Loveday, 2005b).
The commitment to performance targets
represents a serious problem for police
forces as they now determine much of the
daily operational work of individual police
officers. This has not gone unnoticed
among those delivering police service and
has led to one officer commenting that
now:
Front-line officers are focusing their
efforts on work that meets the targets set
against them as opposed to the needs of
the public which offers no kudos to the
officer (Morris, 2005).
This issue is closely associated to wider
concerns as to the impact of ever-increasing
use of performance management tech-
niques across public services. Although the
use of performance measures was to have
been initiated by earlier Conservative Gov-
ernments in the 1980s and 1990s it has been
the comprehensive application of such
measures and targets to all public services by
New Labour since its first election success
in 1997 that is of more immediate interest.
This has been sustained by the Prime
Minister’s Public Service Delivery Unit and
also reflected in an unusually close personal
interest taken by the Prime Minister in the
performance of public services particularly
that of the police in relation to crime rates.
This has been now almost institutionalised
by the regular quarterly meeting at Down-
ing Street to determine whether Public
Service Agreements (PSAs) have been met
and over which the Prime Minister person-
ally presides. Inevitably this has placed
enormous pressure on both Ministers and
civil servants to achieve results (Loveday,
2005a). Centrally determined performance
targets have assumed, as a result, over-
whelming significance for every public
service manager. Along with this has gone
closer targeting of service delivery and the
use thereafter of audit regimes to monitor
public service ‘success’. Monitoring per-
formance now constitutes a major element
of performance management and has as a
function experienced a period of relentless
expansion (Hetherington, 2004).
IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE
While police services were to be encour-
aged by way of Home Office Circular
114/83 to improve efficiency, economy and
effectiveness, there was to be no significant
attempt by the centre to reform police
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practice until the early 1990s when in quick
succession the Major Government intro-
duced a police reform programme which
was to encompass the 1992 White Paper on
Police Reform and the 1993 Sheehy
Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and
Rewards. The radical structural proposals
presented within both the White Paper and
final Sheehy Report were, however, to be
significantly diluted as the Conservative
Government held back from the reform
programme it had earlier heralded as essen-
tial to improve police services.
In place of major reform, police services
were instead made subject to an increasing
range of performance measures which were
to be formalised within the Police and
Magistrates Courts Act 1994. This provided
the Home Secretary with the power to
determine national police priorities. These
would be published thereafter within every
‘Local Police Plan’ produced by the police
authority and chief officer.
The same legislation was to also sever
links between the police service and local
authority as police authorities became free-
standing corporate bodies. These highly sig-
nificant developments were to alter the
relationship between police forces and the
Home Office radically. It also gave a statut-
ory power to the Home Secretary to deter-
mine police priorities and, in effect, direct
police services.
The Conservative legacy for policing, as
enshrined within the 1994 Act was, in
retrospect, to establish an important preced-
ent and springboard for intervention by
successor administrations. This has indeed
proved to be the case and was to be con-
solidated with New Labour’s Police
Reform Act 2002. This legislation provided
the Home Secretary with powers to set
national police priorities, remove chief
officers and directly intervene in the man-
agement of local police services. This would
be conducted under the banner of ‘improv-
ing police performance’. These powers
were to be fully exercised by David Blun-
kett as Home Secretary in conjunction with
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
(HMIC) and the Police Standards Unit
(PSU). The opportunity for intervention
was to arise from an inspection process of all
Basic Command Units (BCUs) which was
conducted by HMIC between 2002 and
2004. This major inspection also identified
‘failing BCUs’ which, following the Police
Reform Act 2002, were now subject to
individual ‘performance’ inspection. Where
critical reports alleging poor performance
were received from HMIC, direct inter-
vention from the Home Office would
quickly follow. This could also lead to the
sudden removal of local BCU commanders
deemed by the centre as responsible for
identified ‘under performance’.
The overt intervention from the Home
Office into BCU performance only
reflected the pressure now exerted by the
Prime Minister’s Public Service Delivery
Unit and the impact of PSAs. This has led
to detailed assessment of individual BCU
performance and also to the creation of ‘hit
lists’ of poorly performing BCUs within the
Home Office. Currently an inspection of
the performance of over 200 BCUs has
been completed by HMIC, details of which
are circulated to the weekly meetings of the
Police Performance Steering Group within
the Home Office (Loveday, 2005a).
POLICE PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT
The salience of police performance man-
agement has been reinforced within HMIC
which has applied increasingly sophisticated
‘police performance monitors’ for police
forces and BCUs (Home Office, 2003a).
The monitors, established within the Police
Performance Assessment Framework
(PPAF), are set in place to enable chief
officers and others to ask questions about
performance variations between forces and
Policing performance
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across police force areas. The use of ‘spider-
grams’ encourages comparisons of perform-
ance between what are judged to be similar
forces rather than against a national average.
This allows for, it is argued, the big vari-
ations in socio-economic and demographic
make-up that are found within police force
areas. Poor performance identified by
HMIC on the spider-gram initially can lead
to a letter from the Inspectorate to the
relevant chief constable. Thereafter, if per-
formance fails to improve, then direct inter-
vention by way of the PSU will be likely as,
for example, recently demonstrated with
Nottinghamshire Police. It is perhaps of no
surprise to learn that currently, the primary
aim of every chief officer in the country is
‘not to receive a letter from HMIC’ (Love-
day, 2005a).
Key national priorities for the police
service are now regularly identified within
National Policing Plans (Home Office,
2003b). Priorities now range from requir-
ing police to provide a ‘citizen-focused
service’ to reducing volume crime and
combating ‘serious and organised crime
both across and within police force bound-
aries’ (Home Office, 2003b, 3.2). All of
these priorities impinge on local policing to
the extent that these and the attendant PSAs
will override local priorities. Some evid-
ence of the extent to which the nationalisa-
tion of policing (and community safety) has
taken place has been demonstrated in rela-
tion to anti-social behaviour and disorder.
Here the National Policing Plan gives pre-
cise guidance to police forces in terms of
their response to this problem. It requires
that all ‘local policing plans’ should examine
deployment of resources to tackle anti-
social behaviour and also the development
of police ‘strategies, policies and protocols’
to encourage this (Home Office, 2003b).
However, the same National Policing Plan
was also to identify the need to tackle
‘organised crime’ which was also central to
the Government’s overall crime reduction
strategy. Use of the National Intelligence
Model (NIM) highlighted the need to
respond to serious and organised crime
‘including drug supply’. This it was argued
operated across force boundaries and was
therefore a ‘key priority for all forces’
(Home Office, 2003b, 4:24).
As National Policing Plans demonstrate,
national priorities now effectively deter-
mine police force activity. These are, as with
other public services, thereafter policed by
extensive audit and inspection regimes. In
2003-06 police force priorities were, for
example, to encompass reductions in vol-
ume crime; alcohol related crime; drug
related crime; gun crime; serious and
organised crime and terrorism (Home
Office, 2003b, 4.38). Further evidence of
central determination of police priorities
was provided by Home Office guidance
identified within its Practical Guide to Per-
formance Measurement (Home Office, 2004).
Within the Guide, the first question that
police forces are, for example, required to
ask of themselves when setting force prior-
ities is ‘what are the national priorities?’.
BCU experience of centrally set
priorities and targets
Some indication of the impact of the per-
formance regime developed by the centre
was to be highlighted by a survey of BCU
commanders conducted on behalf of the
Police Superintendents Association in 2003
(BRMB, 2003). As was to be discovered for
these officers, ‘performance’ was seen to
relate to targets and the collection of quant-
itative data on crime statistics, complaints,
sickness rates, charge and caution rates
(BRMB, 83). Yet the data required did not
refer to quality of service, while the use of
national indicators proved to be not suffi-
ciently discriminating to allow for the
impact on policing of the local environ-
ment. This was seen as a serious weakness as
insufficient allowance was made for levels of
deprivation in the local community for
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which the BCU was responsible. The sur-
vey was to note that frequently there could
be a significant difference between national
targets and local need:
Commanders could find national targets
frustrating especially if Home Office
priorities did not match local needs. An
example would be the push toward street
crime when this was not an issue in the
BCU and where resources that were
needed for tackling burglaries had to be
diverted into street crime (BRMB, 97).
Where national priorities did match BCU
crime problems, directing additional
resources to these could enable the com-
mander to present the BCU as ‘performing
well’. Nevertheless, one recurring com-
ment arising from the survey was the high
salience accorded within nationally set
priorities to ‘reduce crime rates’. Currently
the target for all BCUs for 2005/08 has
been set at a 15 per cent reduction in crime
although the target is higher for high crime
areas. Yet the problem for many BCU com-
manders has proved to be how already low
recorded crime rates can be reduced by the
target figure set by the centre. As was to be
argued:
Commanders in low crime areas were
particularly perplexed over the judge-
ment that they were poorly performing if
they failed to reduce what were already
low crime rates which could be a very
challenging task (BRMB, 98).
Concern was to be also expressed over the
frequent speed with which government
priorities could change. This could be par-
ticularly frustrating for those responsible for
their implementation. It was felt that a
much smaller number of priorities set
locally for a four- to five-year period and
over which they had some control was
more likely to be of value. This was to be
linked to the not infrequent problem of
national targets not always being aligned
with local Crime Reduction and Disorder
Reduction Partnership (CDRP) priorities
where preference was given to national tar-
gets ‘in spite of the emphasis placed on
CDRP and local strategies’ (BRMB, 98).
While the specific problem of target setting
has been overcome by ensuring that all local
CDRP priorities reflect those set nationally
this has come at some cost to local delivery
of community safety (Loveday, 2006).
Additional problems in the use of nation-
ally set performance indicators related to
the extent that they were relevant to local
BCU needs. Recent Home Office focus on
‘volume crime’ including burglary, robbery
and vehicle crime for example were not
problems that extended to all BCUs. Yet the
emphasis given to volume crime in the
National Policing Plan had meant that
much bigger problems of fear of crime and
anti-social behaviour could not be ade-
quately addressed. A final problem identi-
fied within the 2003 survey was what was
seen as being the rather naïve and exag-
gerated perception held by the centre as to
what local police commanders could actu-
ally achieve in terms of reducing crime.
This was not helped by the fact that they
usually did not have control over all the
factors influencing performance particularly
that of control of the local police budget
(BRMB, 2003, 83).
THE IMPACT OF PERFORMANCE
TARGETS
The pronounced increase in public spend-
ing and investment in public services
embarked upon by New Labour must be
acknowledged. Currently involving a 3.3
per cent rise per year in spending in real
terms over the years 2004 to 2006, it is
estimated that in money terms this translates
to around £60 billions in spending all of
which is directed at key priorities of health,
Policing performance
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education, personal social services, trans-
port, housing and criminal justice (CIPD,
2003). Yet this major increase in spending
comes with many strings attached. Result-
ing increases in performance and service are
a matter of immediate concern to the Gov-
ernment which requires evidence of
improvements within all public services.
This, and the Prime Minister’s personal
commitment to their use, mean that cent-
rally set performance targets remain a basic
element to the Governments strategy and
also why the Public Service Delivery Unit
can exercise such comprehensive influence.
Yet because central Government depart-
ments and their civil servants are imme-
diately responsible for individual service
performance, the management orientation
is ‘top-down’. Here managing-up, through
the bureaucratic hierarchy is paramount,
not the development of a mechanism to
encourage ‘delivery down to service deliv-
erers’ (CIPD, 2003, 4). The direct result has
been a further proliferation of centrally set
targets to measure performance. With these
targets has gone a much more intrusive use
of regulators and auditing regimes to ensure
service conformity. This proliferation of tar-
gets has been directly challenged within the
same CIPD Report where it is suggested
that:
It is hard to calculate the number of
targets that the public sector is subject to.
At national level the PSAs that depart-
ments and agencies conclude with the
Treasury comprise around 125, on the
Delivery Unit’s own admission. The
NHS alone has at least 60. These are
subdivided into many more at the point
of delivery. One estimate is that local
government has more than 600 targets to
meet (CIPD, 5).
The widespread use of performance targets
has been matched by a major expansion of
audit and inspection regimes. In 2004 it was
estimated that the total cost of audit and
inspection regimes for public services
involved an annual spend of £600 million
(Hetherington, 2004). Yet the real issue
surrounding this audit regime is the way it
sustains ‘highly specified, centrally deter-
mined targets and standards enforced by
close monitoring (CIPD, 5). Performance
compliance represents in effect the imple-
mentation of a ‘neo-Taylorian’ management
approach. This is symptomatic of the mass
production systems within which manage-
ment is separated from work and employees
‘have little scope for initiative and no mar-
gin for error’. Here all focus is directed to
management targets rather than customer
or citizen needs. Within this regime cus-
tomer choice is tightly constrained and
‘becomes what the target setter says it is’.
These features, it is argued, would appear to
be best applied to ‘low trust, low discretion
and low ambition organisations’ (CIPD, 5).
Within the command and control system
that performance targeting brings, there are
further dangers that may threaten standards
of service. As argued by Caulkin (2004) this
system of management can be expected to
bring the application in practice of ever
stricter performance measures. Yet as the
targets become ever tighter they damage
both innovation and trust within the service
they are designed to improve (Caulkin). A
performance regime, he adds, where under-
performance is identified can generate a
vicious circle of further surveillance and
monitoring which inevitably invites yet fur-
ther monitoring or direct intervention. This
can ironically lead to a situation where
performance management can effectively
undermine if not destroy performance
(Caulkin). As has been argued in relation
to public services which are often best
described as complex human activity sys-
tems, these cannot be managed by crude
performance targets:
These bend them out of shape and make
implementers ‘look the wrong way’ – at
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the targets rather than the needs of their
clientele. Nor can they be managed by
reductionist command and control
methods because of the many unin-
tended consequences (Caulkin, 2002).
Performance targets and unintended
consequences
The comprehensive application of perform-
ance targets across the public sector has also
had a significant impact on the role and
purpose of management within the sector.
It has become clear that the need to achieve
centrally set targets is now the major driver
for managers and service deliverers. Yet this
may be at the cost of improving the effec-
tiveness of public services (Loveday, 2005b).
This is because the commitment to
improved performance can generate often
perverse consequences for the service sub-
ject to such control.
This issue has been explored recently by
the Audit Commission (2003). In its 2003
Report it was to comment critically on the
number of targets set for public services and
also on the ‘time boundaries’ set for achiev-
ing these targets. The latter were seen as
being far too narrow and had the perverse
effect of encouraging what the Audit Com-
mission was to describe as ‘gaming’ within
which the management objective became
one of achieving set targets at the cost of
any improvement to service effectiveness
(Audit Commission, 15). Yet, as the same
report was to note, while appropriate time
boundaries were seen as being important,
they were ‘politically difficult to negotiate as
yearly targets were favoured by Govern-
ment that wanted publicly identifiable
results for electoral reasons’ (Audit Com-
mission, 15). One result of the use of per-
formance targets has been the widespread
application of gaming strategies within most
public services to achieve central targets.
Within the Education sector, for exam-
ple, the need for head teachers to secure
their position within national school league
tables in terms of examination results can
encourage school exclusions while condon-
ing truancies where academic resources are
seen best targeted at the academically able.
In this environment low achieving pupils
may not be excluded but rather are ‘just not
counted’ (Loveday, Button, Fletcher, &
Blackbourn, 2004). The rising incidence of
reprimands of teaching staff accused of
‘improving’ SAT examination results in
order to achieve set targets is now also well
established (Loveday, 2005b).
In the Health Service, as a direct result of
the number of performance targets to
which it is subject, ‘gaming’ has now
become a central management tool. It is
commonplace for local mangers to manip-
ulate hospital waiting lists. In the North
Bristol Health Trust it was to be learned
that ‘gaming’ could take extreme forms.
Here it was discovered that:
The local Royal United hospital had
achieved a ‘one star’ until it transpired
that, to hit its ‘maximum four hour wait
in casualty’ target it was hiding patients
in ambulances. Frenchay and South-
mead, part of the North Bristol Trust also
clocked up the largest recorded debt in
NHS history (nearly £50 million) claim-
ing it spent the money on agency staff in
order to hit central targets’ (Hammond,
2004).
Elsewhere the Department of Health was
forced to undertake investigations in East
Sussex over identified ‘irregularities in the
recording of waiting times’, the result of a
local Hospital Trust commitment to hitting
targets. The Trust, earlier lauded by Minis-
ters for improving from zero stars to two
stars in 2002 was, it was noted ‘to fall back
to zero stars in 2004’ (Carvel, 2004). In its
2005 Report the Healthcare Commission
was to identify the performance of hospitals
in relation to a number of specific targets
among which was ‘patient waiting time in A
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and E wards’. It recorded that all hospital
trusts had met the target of 90 per cent of
patients waiting less than four hours
(Womack, 2005). The Healthcare Commis-
sion did not report the ‘gaming’ of the
Trusts to achieve that target. This was to be
highlighted by a member of the BMA
earlier in 2005 who challenged the need for
this target which potentially threatened the
welfare of patients rather than helping
them. One consequence of the A and E
four-hour waiting time had been to swamp
many other wards with cases for which they
were not equipped to deal. This was
because ‘A and E’ departments throughout
the country were now ‘transferring many
cases on to other wards without proper
assessment of need in order to meet the
4-hour target’ (Loveday, 2005b).
One further danger which can be
directly linked to performance targets and
the highly political context within which
they are used, has also been identified
within the health service:
Within this politicised system, the
money goes to ‘sexy’ areas that grab
headlines. We may have cut surgery wait-
ing lists but if you are old, mentally ill or
have an unfashionable illness, the out-
look can be grim (Hammond, 2004).
POLICING INTEGRITY
The problems attendant on gaming, the
direct result of ‘performance target setting’
have also extended to the police service.
This has taken a number of forms but in
large part conforms to ‘gaming’ strategies
now comprehensively played by other pub-
lic services. This was evidenced most
recently in an interesting example arising
within Surrey Police. Here it was alleged
that to boost response times to calls for
emergency police service, bogus calls were
made by members of Surrey Police to
improve the figures. When targets were
missed, it was claimed, members of the
police force were told to improve results by
themselves making emergency calls on
mobile telephones (The Times, 1/7/2005).
Nor is this an isolated example. In what
might be viewed, in terms of past police
practice, as an interesting case of de´ja` vu,
officers from Greater Manchester police
were recently found guilty by an internal
tribunal of ‘lying to boost crime detection
rates’. Ironically the police deception was to
come to light as the force, impressed by
Stockport division’s success in crime fight-
ing, looked at its work in some detail to ‘see
what lessons could be learned’ (Carter,
2004). They were to discover that high
crime clear-up rates had in fact been
achieved by ‘encouraging’ criminals while
on remand to admit to other offences. It
was noted that:
On one occasion, a criminal was able to
see his new baby for the first time. He is
alleged to have unwittingly signed docu-
ments in which he admitted to hundreds
of offences he had not committed.
Another man on remand was taken out
of prison and allowed to see his girl-
friend. He allegedly confessed to 200
crimes he did not commit (Carter).
The Greater Manchester case is instructive.
Although this particular practice in clearing
crime within police forces does have a
substantial and well-documented lineage, it
was to be the subject of a major ACPO
initiative within which the encouragement
of ethical crime recording and detection
practices was central. It is, however, clear
that the demands of performance targets
may challenge the best laid plans if only
because BCU commanders will seek to
avoid the threat of being classified as
‘failing’.
Interestingly HMIC, which now acts as a
central government agent in ‘policing per-
formance’, itself highlighted earlier the very
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dangers that performance management
could generate for the police service. In its
Thematic on Police Integrity (HMIC,
1999) HMIC noted that the ‘increasingly
aggressive and demonstrable performance
culture’ was a major factor affecting the
integrity in the service. It noted that ques-
tionnaire replies from chief constables had
highlighted the performance culture as ‘a
cause for lapses in integrity’ and that a
number of police forces had a tendency to
‘trawl the margins for detections’ (Police
Review, 1999). The Report also noted that
while crime-recording systems were ‘gen-
erally satisfactory’ there were still pockets of
unethical crime recording that had to be
eradicated to ‘ensure the public had con-
fidence in police performance figures’
(Police Review).
Concern about performance culture
expressed by HMIC may now be more
difficult to address as the full panoply of
targets, inspection and audit continues to
expand, engulfing the police as other public
services. The problem of integrity can of
course be linked to the very nature of
performance targets. Many years ago com-
mentators on managerial behaviour identi-
fied the problems linked to performance
‘goal setting’ within organisations. As was
argued, goal setting could not be expected
to improve motivation but it would give the
individual a ‘much clearer idea of where to
direct his [sic] effort’. It worked because it
helped to ‘define the task for the individual
rather than stimulate greater effort’ (Camp-
bell et al., 1970, 377–383). Within the
private sector targets like earlier organisa-
tional goals can serve to simplify and direct
the work process. However this approach
can be potentially dangerous within com-
plex public services where citizen–customer
perceptions are seen as paramount.
The use of performance targets may also
lead to the reification of ‘command and
control’ management systems. Ironically it
was from this that the police service was in
the process of trying to escape. As has been
argued, the modernising approach involved
in moving the police from a hierarchic,
military command and control model to
one that is customer-facing and problem-
solving orientated always presented a major
challenge (CIPD, 2003, 21). But this has
now been made more difficult when the
use of targets has re-established a command
and control model albeit this time encour-
aged from the centre. A more profitable, but
much more challenging approach would be
to attempt to measure ‘outcomes’ of police
activity rather than rely on the highly
mechanistic management of performance
(CIPD, 21).
A further irony of its commitment to
performance management arises from the
Government’s earlier objective which was
to establish a ‘joined-up approach’ to public
service delivery. This commitment was to
find its earliest manifestation in the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998 within which com-
munity safety and crime reduction strategies
were to be developed locally in ‘partner-
ship’. Yet its commitment to driving up
performance within public services has
meant that the Government has created
formidable barriers to the ability of local
services to develop such partnerships. The
identification of performance targets for
individual services effectively ends the
development of partnership work (Loveday,
2005b). As has been argued by Caulkin, the
Government continues to pursue a ‘reduc-
tionist approach’ by ‘breaking down prob-
lems into component parts and then
attempting to solve them in a linear fashion’
(Caulkin, 2004). One result of this is that
individual service targets become para-
mount, not partnership priorities.
A SYSTEMS APPROACH
One potential solution to the problem now
confronting Government would be to
recognise that public services are ‘complex
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human activity systems’ that are not likely
to be effectively managed by the application
of crude performance targets or the use of
command and control methods. (Caulkin,
2004, 2). Unlike performance management
a ‘systems’ approach stresses the funda-
mental interconnectedness of services and
recognises that incremental service im-
provements require not targets but long-
term learning processes and ‘where success
is judged by service users not governments’
(Caulkin, 2). A similar conclusion has been
reached by Seddon who has argued that
despite the Government’s ‘armies of aud-
itors’ directed at public services, it has no
way of really knowing what levels of service
are being achieved. Rather than identifying
levels of service it measures activities and
functions such as service response times or
hospital waiting lists (Caulkin, 2004). Yet as
Caulkin (2004) argues:
This is the opposite of joined-up man-
agement since the measures do not relate
to overall purpose they cannot help pro-
viders to improve.
In moving away from traditional command
and control styles of management there is a
further case for ending the current reliance
on the application of performance targets.
This reflects the fact that performance man-
agement undermines both trust and auton-
omy within organisations that are subject to
it (CIPD, 2003). The issues of trust and
autonomy have a continuing application
within complex human activity systems
where the delivery of face-to-face service
can depend on discretionary behaviour that
employers may find hard to specify and
monitor. This might for instance include
among service staff ‘friendliness of response,
willingness to listen or to suggest altern-
atives, or internally to share knowledge
with colleagues’ (CIPD, 22). These are, it is
argued, all aspects of performance that can-
not be commanded by the employer, only
given by the employee (CIPD, 22).
In place of the command and control
approach there is a growing case for devel-
oping within a systems approach a ‘high
performance model’ for public services.
Here the dynamism for high performance is
not imposed externally but is generated
from within the organisation. As has been
argued, there is a need for public sector
managers to develop their own approaches
to improving quality and service levels
which, if encouraged, would also help turn
‘the rhetoric of localism and autonomy into
reality’ (Emmott, 2003).
Systems application
The development of a ‘systems approach’ to
public service management would allow for
local managerial discretion, autonomy and
the re-establishment of trust. An example of
a systems approach has most recently been
developed within the context of new
‘neighbourhood policing’ strategies to
which most police forces have now signed
up. In developing their ‘Citizen Focus Pro-
cess Model’, Smith and Alderson (2005)
have, for example, established a framework
for ‘Effective Future Policing’ which is
directed to service delivery within a Part-
nership and Neighbourhood Policing con-
text. The Citizen Focus Process Model
highlights the importance of the local
environment for effective future policing. It
also provides, within a systems approach, a
local feedback mechanism that in turn gen-
erates additional inputs in to the Citizen
Focus Process (Smith and Alderson). This
model emphasises the significance of local
environments to policing while also
encouraging an assessment of outcomes
rather than outputs (Smith and Alderson).
A ‘systems model’ such as that identified
by Smith and Alderson (2005) would cur-
rently fit well within the new horizons for
local policing now identified by a major
police association. The Police Super-
intendents Association has, for example,
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unequivocally stated that, within the Part-
nership arrangements established by the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, effective
local policing depends most critically on
shared boundaries with local authorities
(Police Superintendents Association, 2004,
4). The same Association has also argued for
delegated budgets to the BCU and for the
local authority to be closely involved in the
selection and appointment of local police
commanders (Police Superintendents Asso-
ciation, 6). In this context ‘going local’
would bring a number of benefits. Cur-
rently entirely absent within externally gen-
erated police performance regimes is any
sense of perceived ownership of perform-
ance measures as applied to the police
organisation. Along with that is a percep-
tion that the measures often lack local rele-
vance. This could be expected to be quickly
remedied by the development of local
policing within a systems model.
CONCLUSION
All of this might suggest the need for a
further re-examination of the determinants
of effective local policing. Here the meas-
ures of performance developed over a dec-
ade ago by Bayley (1994) could prove to be
of some value. Bayley’s ‘hard and direct’
police indicators encompass crime rates and
criminal victimisations but extend well
beyond that to include (local) ‘real estate
values’, ‘public utilisation of common
space’, ‘commercial activity’ and the ‘num-
ber of community problems solved’. The
development and implementation of per-
formance measures around matters of
immediate local concern would also be
built on effective local partnership arrange-
ments. It would also be based on an assess-
ment of ‘outcomes’ of police activity in
relation to partner services, rather than the
simplistic measurement of police ‘outputs’.
For a systems approach to policing to
develop, much will inevitably depend on
decisions taken by Government. Currently
the power relationship between centre and
local service providers established over the
last 20 years does not currently appear
amenable to change. A high performance
public service model based on autonomy
and trust requires the Government to relin-
quish control of local services. But, as has
been argued, one clear feature of the Gov-
ernment’s approach is that it shows a
remarkable consistency in ‘not letting go’ of
local services (CIPD, 2003, 27). It is clear
that real improvement in service delivery
within both the police and other public
services will be only likely to occur as a
consequence of Government ‘switching off
centrally set targets’. Unfortunately the
evidence to date suggests that relinquishing
control of local services does not form a
part of New Labour’s political vocabulary.
Indeed in its third term of office there is
every expectation that the Government
could prove to be yet more intrusive as it
continues to pursue its commitment to
‘driving up’ performance within public
services.
NOTE
* This article is based on a paper prepared
for the Senior Leadership Development
Programme, ‘Delivering BCU Perform-
ance’ for Centrex Bramshill, August 2005.
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